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Previous scholarship has shown that physical distance significantly affects 
organizational form and business strategy in various contexts, including national and 
international retailing (Brickley and Dark 1987; Lafontaine and Slade 1996; Fladmoe-
Lindquist and Jacque 1995), bank’s loan portfolios (Laderman et al. 1991), 
investment portfolios (Coval and Moskowitz 1999), and trucking (Hubbard 2000).   
The results of all of these studies are consistent with the proposition that monitoring 
costs increase with physical distance.     
 
  Our paper extends this analysis to the mode of international direct 
investment.  Where monitoring costs are high, it is relatively more attractive for a 
foreign investor to form a joint venture with a local partner to help in managing the 
investment (Kogut and Singh 1988; Hennart 1991; Hanson 1995).  Accordingly, to 
the extent that monitoring costs increase with physical distance, investments that 
are further from the foreign investor’s home base should be more likely to be 
formed as joint ventures.   
 
  We test this hypothesis using a data set of 148 Taiwanese direct investments 
made in Mainland China between 1987-91.  Owing to a peculiarity of Taiwanese law 
that we explain below, this data set is uniquely suited to the testing of the relation 
between physical distance and the mode of international investment.  The empirical 
tests lend strong support to the hypothesis: an investment located 1000 kilometers 
further away was 14-17% more likely to be formed as a joint venture.  This result 
was robust to a number of different specifications and modeling assumptions. 
 
 
2. Theoretical  Framework   
 
An investor in unfamiliar territory, whether another city, another state, or another 
country, is potentially subject to opportunistic behavior at the hands of local 
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resolved through either ownership or contract (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and 
Moore 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Chaps. 6, 9, and 16).   
 
  The effectiveness of ownership depends on the potential extent for moral 
hazard with respect to the investment.  A party that has a smaller share of the 
residual income from an asset will have relatively less incentive to invest time and 
effort in the asset.   
 
The effectiveness of contract also depends on the “contractability” of the 
potential opportunistic act, which in turn depends on the legal environment, 
including the laws and the enforcement system, the cost of monitoring compliance, 
and other factors.  Some actions are relatively easier to contract upon than others, 
for instance, it is easier to monitor the quantity than the quality of the production.   
If the court system is arbitrary and capricious, contracts will be less effective. 
  
Accordingly, ownership will be the solution for opportunistic acts that present 
relatively less moral hazard on the part of the party taking reduced ownership and 
that are relatively difficult to contract upon.  When, however, these factors weigh in 
the opposite direction, contract will be the solution (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 
and Moore 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Chaps. 6, 9, and 16). 
 
 
In the case of international direct investment, the ownership/contract trade-off 
resolves to a choice between a joint venture and wholly (foreign) ownership.   If a 
foreign investor relies on contract to resolve the potential for opportunistic behavior, 
it retains complete ownership of the investment (wholly foreign owned).  By 
contrast, if the investor uses ownership to resolve the potential for opportunistic 
behavior, it forms a joint venture with local partners. 
 
Previous scholarship into international direct investment has considered 
various economic and non-economic factors that influence the choice of investment 
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investor’s previous experience (Hennart 1991), variability in the demand for the 
product (Hanson 1995), foreign investor and domestic partner sizes (Kogut and 
Singh 1988), and the cultural distance between the countries of the foreign investor 
and investment (Kogut and Singh 1988; Brouthers and Brouthers 2001).  
 
In this paper, we focus on the effect of a particular economic factor – 
physical distance -- on the mode of international direct investment.  This research is 
motivated by previous scholarship showing the significance of physical distance for 
organizational form and business strategy in several contexts.    
 
In retailing, it is more costly for headquarters to monitor an outlet at a 
greater distance, and hence it is relatively more cost-effective to delegate 
management of the outlet to a franchisee.  Consistent with this analysis, retail 
outlets more distant from corporate headquarters were relatively more likely to be 
franchised than company operated.  This held true for both national (Brickley and 
Dark 1987; Lafontaine and Slade 1996) and international retail networks (Fladmoe-
Lindquist and Jacque 1995).   
 
Physical distance has also influenced business strategy.  The loan portfolios of 
rural banks had a higher percentage of agricultural loans than the portfolios of 
urban banks (Laderman et al. 1991).  Investment managers invested 
disproportionately in locally-headquartered companies (Coval and Moskowitz 1999).  
Trucks operating at relatively longer distances were more likely to be equipped with 
on-board monitoring equipment (Hubbard 2000).   All of these results are consistent 
with the costs of monitoring at greater distance being relatively higher.     
 
  Here, we extend this analysis to the mode of international direct investment.  
If monitoring costs are higher, it is relatively more attractive for a foreign investor to 
form a joint venture with a local partner to help in managing the investment.  
Supposing that monitoring costs increase with physical distance, our central 
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base are more likely to be structured as joint ventures.   
 
  We should note that monitoring costs might not simply be a linear function of 
physical distance.  Monitoring may involve a certain degree of fixed costs.  Further, 
in so far as monitoring involves travel, the actual cost of monitoring should be the 
lower of the costs of surface and air travel. 
 
  Below, we test our proposition using data for 148 Taiwanese investments in 
China over the period 1987-91. 
 
 
3.  Chinese Investment Environment 
 
During the relevant period (1987-91), the Chinese Government recognized three 
modes for inward direct investment -- wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFO), 
equity joint venture (EJV), and cooperative joint venture (CJV).
1  These three modes 
were frequently called the san zi qi ye (three investment enterprises).   
 
  To establish an equity joint venture, the investors had to incorporate a limited 
liability company in China.  The foreign equity percentage was required to be at 
least 25 percent.
2  By contrast, a cooperative joint venture was just a contract 
between an inward investor and a domestic partner.  It did not require the 
establishment of a separate Chinese company.  There was no minimum foreign 
equity percentage, and, further, the partners could distribute the profits according to 
proportions that differed from the equity shares, if any. 
 
  Chinese Government policy towards wholly foreign-owned enterprises was 
relatively more restrictive.   A wholly foreign-owned enterprise had either to use 
                                                           
1         The following review of Chinese law and regulations is based, in part, on China Business Law 
Guide, Sections 25-010 to 26-900.   
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Government prohibited wholly foreign-owned enterprises from specified sectors and 
restricted them in others.   
 
  All three modes of investment -- wholly foreign-owned enterprises, equity 
joint ventures, and cooperative joint ventures -- were subject to the same income 
tax at a combined central and local rate of 33 percent.   
 
 
Several other features of the investment environment are worth highlighting.  First, 
foreign investors encountered difficulties in enforcing their rights.  In December 
1982, China revised its Constitution to guarantee protection of the lawful rights and 
interests of foreign-invested enterprises.  Under Chinese law, disputes among 
participants of joint ventures had to be referred to arbitration before the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.  However, some foreign 
investors had difficulty enforcing Commission awards against local entities (Nyaw 
1993, pp. 16.25-16.26).   
 
A related issue was hold up by government officials: “[officials] often made 
up taxes, rules, and regulations as they went along, rather than following any 
written policy” (Time, June 2, 1986).  Abuse was so widespread that the Chinese 
Government published a regulation stirringly entitled, Notice of the State Council on 




  Second, China particularly encouraged investment in Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs).  Between 1980-88, the Chinese Government established five SEZs -- in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan Province.  These SEZs offered 
superior infrastructure, more favorable investment incentives, greater flexibility in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2          Equity joint ventures were legalized in July 1979, and the Chinese Government issued the 
corresponding regulations four years later (Nyaw 1993, 16.21). 
3    Che and Qian (1998) and Litwack and Qian (1998) discuss various institutional solutions to 
the potential for expropriation by Chinese authorities. 
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and Zhao 1994). 
 
Third, for political reasons, Taiwanese investors received preferential 
treatment in China.  The Chinese Government considered Taiwan to be a province of 
China rather than a foreign country.  Also, it was concerned to foster good relations 
with the Taiwan business community in order to advance the cause of eventual re-
unification (Sung 1992).  Accordingly, the Chinese Government accorded special 
treatment to Taiwanese investors, including an unrestricted choice among equity 
and cooperative joint ventures and wholly foreign ownership, no limit on the 






In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government retreated from (mainland) China 
to Taiwan.  The victorious Communist Party established a new government of China.  
For 38 years, the Nationalist Government of Taiwan prohibited Taiwanese from 
investing in China.  Then, in November 1987, the Taiwan Government lifted its long-
standing ban (Kao et al. 1992, page 217).   
 
In September-October 1991, Kao et al. (1992) sent a detailed questionnaire 
to all registered Mainland investors.
 5  Please refer to the Appendix for details of the 
data-set.  Table 1 reports summary statistics.   On average, the total capital 
employed when the factory was established was US$ 2.285 million, and 23.5% of 
production was sold to the domestic Chinese market.  These numbers are broadly 
consistent with general characterizations of Taiwanese investments in China at the 
                                                           
4       State Council Regulations to Encourage Investment by Taiwanese Businessmen, July 1988.   
5       Under Taiwanese law, all outbound foreign investors must get approval from the Investment 
Commission at the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  Some Taiwanese investors, however, channeled 
investments through third territories such as Hong Kong and Singapore so as to avoid having to 
register as investing in Mainland China. 
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technology industries (Sung 1992, page 39; Nyaw 1993, pp. 16.7-16.10). 
 
Further, the average investment was located 1253 kilometers from Hong 
Kong.  There was considerable variation in location, with the standard deviation of 
distance being 1216 kilometers.  Of the 148 investments, 47 were located in Special 
Economic Zones, and 51 in the province of Fujian. 
  
Regarding the form of investment, 89 of the investments were wholly foreign 
(Taiwanese) owned, 52 were equity joint ventures, and only 7 were cooperative 
joint ventures.  Again, these numbers are consistent with Nyaw’s (1993) broad 
characterization of foreign investment into China:  “EJVs have become increasingly 
important since 1985.  The number of WFOs also surged after 1987 whereas CJVs … 
declined” (page 16.7).    
 
 
This data set is particularly well-suited to testing the significance of monitoring costs 
for the mode of international direct investment.   The investments were spread over 
many locations in China.  Yet, owing to a peculiarity of Taiwanese law, it is possible 
to identify the cost of monitoring quite accurately with a single measure of physical 
distance.  As Taiwanese law prohibited direct trade, transport, and communication 
with China, almost all travel and communication between Taiwan and China passed 
through Hong Kong.  Since Taiwan itself is fairly small, we can identify the cost of 
monitoring an investment in China with the physical distance between Hong Kong 
and the location of the investment.   
 
  In December 1994, two Korean airlines – Asiana and Korean Airlines – 
initiated commercial air service between Seoul and Beijing, providing an alternative 
air route between Taiwan and China.
6  Hence, it would be more problematic to 
measure the cost of monitoring Taiwanese investments in China made after 
December 1994. 
                                                           
6     Airline websites: http://www.flyasiana.com/ and http://www.koreanair.co.kr/. 
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5. Hypotheses 
 
Our central proposition is that investments located at a greater distance are more 
likely to be structured as joint ventures.  Owing to the Taiwan Government’s 
prohibition against direct trade, transport, and communication with China, the 
relevant measure of distance is from Hong Kong to the investment location.  
Following Cheng and Zhao (1994), we measure distances along straight lines from 
the relevant city or provincial capital to Hong Kong.  Accordingly, we have: 
H1:  An investment further from Hong Kong would be more likely to be 
formed as a joint venture. 
 
We also include several control variables that might influence the choice of 
investment mode.  The first control variable is the size of the investment.  The larger 
the required capital, the greater would be the risk, which has been shown to play a 
significant role in the choice of investment mode (Hanson 1995).  In addition, to the 
extent that the investment is immobile, the Taiwanese investor would be subject to 
opportunistic actions by local officials and businesses.  Hence, the Taiwanese 
investor would prefer a Chinese partner.  This motivates: 
H2:  A larger investment would be more likely to be formed as a joint 
venture. 
 
The next two control variables are specific to the investment environment in 
China.  Under Chinese law, a wholly foreign-owned enterprise must either use 
advanced technology or export at least 50 percent of its production.  Even absent 
such a law, a Taiwanese investor targeting the domestic (Chinese) market would 
have relatively greater need of a local partner to assist with marketing.  Accordingly, 
we expect that investments with a larger proportion of sales to the Chinese market 
would be more likely to be formed as joint ventures.  
H3:  An investment with a larger proportion of sales to the Chinese market 
would be more likely to be formed as a joint venture. 
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Special Economic Zones (SEZs) offered superior infrastructure, more 
favorable investment incentives and tax treatment, and easier investment approval 
(Cheng and Zhao 1994).  Further, the special status of SEZs has been interpreted as 
a commitment by the Chinese Government against official expropriation (Litwack 
and Qian 1998).  Accordingly,  
H4:  An investment in a Special Economic Zone would be less likely to be 
formed as a joint venture.   
 
6. Empirical  Results 
 
To operationalize the theory of investment mode, we propose a logistic discrete-
choice model.  We record investments in the form of either equity or cooperative 
joint ventures as JV = 1, and investments that were wholly owned by the Taiwanese 
investor as JV = 0.  The basic independent variables are: distance from Hong Kong 
(DISTHK), capital at time of establishment (ESTCAP), proportion of sales to the 
Chinese market (SALESPRC), and location in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ).  
 
Table 3 reports the results.  Let us first review column (a).   The coefficient of 
distance to Hong Kong (DISTHK) was positive and significant at the 99% confidence 
level.  This was consistent with our central hypothesis H1 that, owing to the 
difficulty of monitoring investments in a more distant location, an investment located 
further away would be more likely to be formed as a joint venture. 
 
The coefficient of the capital at time of establishment (ESTCAP) was not 
significant.  This result was not consistent with the risk-sharing hypothesis H2 that 
investments involving larger amounts of capital would be more likely to be formed 
as joint ventures.  Below, we explain how this result depended on an extreme data 
point. 
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was positive and significant at the 95% level.  This was consistent with the 
hypothesis H3 that, owing to Government restrictions on domestic sales by wholly-
foreign owned projects, investments with a higher proportion of sales to the Chinese 
market were more likely to be formed as joint ventures. 
 
The coefficient of Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was negative and significant 
at the 95% level.  This was consistent with hypothesis H4 that Special Economic 
Zones provided government commitment against holdup by local authorities.   
 
  Overall, the results in Table 3, column (a), provide strong support to the 
central hypothesis regarding the impact of physical distance, and some support to 
the control hypotheses regarding the impact of sales to the China market and 
location in a Special Economic Zone.  We next consider why the results were not 
consistent with the hypothesis H2 regarding the size of the investment. 
 
 
In terms of size, as measured by the capital at time of establishment, there was one 
extreme case.  Referring to Table 1, the largest investment involved capital of 
US$206.7 million.  This was over 10 times larger than the next largest investment 
(US$20 million capital) and 90 times larger than the average (US$2.285 million 
capital).  Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider the US$206.7 investment as an 
outlier and exclude it from further analysis.
 7 
 
  In Table 3, column (b), we present the logistic regression, excluding the 
outlier.  The effect of distance continued to be positive and significant at the 99% 
level.  However, with the exclusion of the outlier, the coefficient of the capital at 
time of establishment (ESTCAP) became positive and significant.  This was 
consistent with the risk-sharing hypothesis H2 that investments involving larger 
amounts of capital would be more likely formed as joint ventures.  The coefficient of 
                                                           
7    This outlier involved an investment was 12 standard deviations larger than the mean investment.  
Further, it was one of only two investments in the service sector.  The overwhelming majority of 
investments (141 of 149) were in manufacturing. 
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the 95% to the 90% level), while that of location in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 
continued to be significant at the 95% level. 
 
  In light of these results, it seemed reasonable to ignore the outlier in the 
subsequent analysis.  From this point onward, we consider Table 3, column (b), to 
be the basic equation with which to compare other specifications.  
 
As we noted above, monitoring costs might not simply be a linear function of 
physical distance.  To check this, we tried specifying distance from Hong Kong in 
logarithmic rather than absolute form.  Table 3, column (c), reports the results.  
Consistent with the central proposition, the coefficient of the distance measure was 
positive and significant.  However, the degree of significance (95% level) was lower 
than in the specification with absolute distance.  Further, the likelihood ratio of the 
specification with logarithmic distance was lower than that with absolute distance.   
 
We also checked the presence of fixed monitoring costs by including the 
interaction between distance from Hong Kong and capital at time of establishment 
(DISTHK x ESTCAP).  Table 3, column (d), reports the results.   The interaction 
variable was not significant.  However, as it was highly correlated with distance and 
capital, each of these variables also ceased to be significant.  We conclude that the 
best specification was that with absolute distance (Table 3, column (b)). 
 
Our data set included investments made between 2-4 years after the Taiwan 
Government legalized direct investment in China.  An interesting question is whether 
the mode of investment changed with time as Taiwanese investors accumulated 
experience.  For instance, investors might have begun with joint ventures and, then 
having built up experience, switched to the wholly foreign-owned mode (Hennart 
1991).   Further, opportunities for investment in China might have changed over 
time in a way that correlated with changes in investor perceptions of contractual 
difficulties. 
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measured the age of the investment in months from the establishment until the 
survey date.
8  Table 3, column (e), reports the results.  The coefficient of AGE was 
negative, which was inconsistent with the argument that later investments were less 
likely to be formed as joint ventures.  Moreover, the coefficient was not significant.  
Thus the evidence was inconsistent with experience effects and a relation between 
changes in investment opportunities and contractual difficulties.   
 
  The inclusion of the AGE variable reduced the magnitude of the coefficient of 
DISTHK, distance from Hong Kong.  Referring to Table 2, AGE and JV were 
negatively correlated while AGE and DISTHK were positively correlated.  It seems 
puzzling that the inclusion of AGE resulted in the coefficient of DISTHK being lower 
than in the basic equation in Table 3 column (b).  The reason is that we did not 
have data on AGE for five investments.  If we had run the basic equation without 
these five records, then the coefficient of DISTHK would have been 0.445. 
 
 
Another possible explanatory variable is cultural differences.  Measuring cultural 
differences by Hofstede’s (1991) national indexes, previous scholarship showed that, 
if the cultural distance between investor and investment location was greater, then 
the investment was more likely to be structured as a joint venture (Kogut and Singh 
1988; Brouthers and Brouthers 2001).  In our data, all investments were located in 
China, hence there was no variation in national culture.  There were, however, 
differences at the provincial level.   Specifically, Taiwan is relatively closer to Fujian 
province in the sense of sharing the Fujian and Fuzhou dialects as well as clan and 
family ties. This cultural closeness has already been cited as influencing the 
magnitude of investment (Sung 1992, page 7).   
 
Table 3, column (f), reports the regression including the variable FUJIAN, 
which indicated investments located in Fujian province.  The coefficient of FUJIAN 
                                                           
8    Table 1 suggests that the data on age of investment may not be completely reliable.  The 
minimum age was –10 months, while the maximum was 242 months, which means that the 
investment preceded the legalization of Taiwanese investments in the Mainland by over 15 years. 
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suggested that investments located in Fujian province were less likely to be formed 
as joint ventures.   This was consistent with the hypothesis that joint ventures are 
less likely in culturally closer locations.   The inclusion of the FUJIAN variable did not 
affect the performance of the other variables.   
 
Next, we explored another aspect of the need to share risk.  Smaller firms would 
have fewer resources to monitor foreign investments, hence should be more likely to 
enter into joint ventures.  Hence, we checked whether investment mode varied 
systematically with the capital of the Taiwanese parent company.  Table 3, column 
(g), reports the regression including the Taiwanese parent capital, PARCAP.  The 
coefficient of PARCAP was not significant.
9 
  
The insignificance of the parent capital was surprising especially as the 
investments were quite large relative to their parent capital: by Table 1, the mean 
investment required capital at establishment of US$0.894 million, as compared with 
the mean Taiwanese parent capital of US$1.167 million.   There are two possible 
reasons why Taiwanese parent capital was not significant.  One is that the 
Taiwanese investors had access to other sources of investment funds, including their 
personal wealth.  Another reason is that the Taiwanese “parent” might itself be a 
subsidiary of a larger group with more substantial capital.
10    
 
The inclusion of the PARCAP variable did not much affect the performance of 
the distance and capital variables.   However, the proportion of sales to China and 
location in a Special Economic Zone dropped in statistical significance.  This might 
be explained by reduced degrees of freedom: we did not have data on capital for 24 
firms. 
 
                                                           
9    We also tried another regression with the capital at establishment, ESTCAP, replaced by a relative 
measure, ESTCAP/PARCAP.  In this regression, the measure of relative capital requirement was 
significant only at the 90% level and the fit was substantially worse than our basic regression, Table 
3, column (b).  For brevity, we do not report this regression. 
10   For instance, the parent capital for the outlier US$206.7 million investment was just $10,377.  We 
understand that the Taiwanese investor was a large group which probably incorporated a separate 
company to carry out the Mainland China investment. 
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industry in which the investment was made.  Investment mode might vary with 
industry for various reasons.  First, the Chinese Government restricted wholly owned 
businesses from some sectors.  While it did not impose such restrictions on 
Taiwanese investments, the restrictions would still have affected Taiwanese 
investors entering China through or together with entities from third jurisdictions 
such as Singapore.  Second, investments in some sectors involve a higher degree of 
sunk costs, hence are more vulnerable to expropriation.  Finally, it might just be that 
more distant investments are disproportionately in industries for which joint ventures 
are particularly favored.   
 
To account for these possibilities, we included a set of variables to indicate 
the industries with more than five investments each – porcelain, sporting goods, 
shoes, metalwork, and electrical goods.  Table 3, column (h), reports the results.  
None of the industry indicators were significant, which suggests that investment 
mode did not systematically vary with industry.  The inclusion of the industry 
indicators did not affect the performance of the other variables, except proportion of 
sales to China, which ceased to be significant. 
 
From our empirical investigations, we conclude that there is strong support for our 
central proposition, that investments located further from the foreign investor’s 
home base are more likely to be formed as joint ventures.   This result was robust to 
a number of alternative specifications.  In the various specifications, the coefficient 
of the distance from Hong Kong (DISTHK) ranged from 0.446 to 0.569 (Table 3, 
columns (b) and (e)-(h)).  By Table 1, the mean proportion of joint ventures was 
0.3986 and the mean distance from Hong Kong (DISTHK) was 1.253 (in thousands 
of kilometers).  Accordingly, the estimates suggest that if an investment were 1000 
kilometers more distant from Hong Kong, it would be 13.4% to 17.1% more likely 
formed as a joint venture.
11 
 
                                                           
11    To illustrate the calculation of the semi-elasticity, 0.3986 x (1 – 0.3986) x 0.446 x 1.253 = 
13.4%. 
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regressions to include only equity joint ventures.  In this case, an investment was 
considered to be a joint venture only if it was an equity joint venture.  As shown in 
Table 4, the results were essentially similar to those reported in Table 3.  The 
coefficient of DISTHK ranged from 0.464 to 0.537, which was contained within the 
range of coefficients of DISTHK in Table 3. 
 
We also repeated the tests using the probit instead of the logistic regression.  
As the results were essentially similar, we omit them here. 
 
7. Concluding  Remarks 
Our central hypothesis was that monitoring costs increase with physical distance, 
and hence, direct investments at a greater distance would be more likely to be 
formed as joint ventures.  We tested this hypothesis on a data set of 148 Taiwanese 
direct investments in Mainland China between 1987-91.  The results lend strong 
support to the hypothesis.  A project that was located 1000 kilometers further from 
Hong Kong was 13-17% more likely to be formed as a joint venture.   
 
Our results also bear specifically on the character of international investment 
into China.  Many studies have observed that China's southern coastal provinces and 
Special Economic Zones have drawn relatively more investment than inland locations 
(Nyaw 1993; Cheng and Zhao 1994).  Here, we show that proximity to Hong Kong 
and location in a Special Economic Zone also had a significant effect on the mode of 
investment.   Accordingly, the same factors that affect the quantity of investment 
also influence the mode of investment.  Previous scholarship has shown that cultural 
distance affects the performance of foreign investments in China (Li et al. 2001).  
Here we found some evidence that cultural distance also affects the mode of 
investment. 
 
The principal limitation of our study is that monitoring costs may be imperfectly 
correlated with distance.  Realistically, the cost of travel is the minimum of the costs 
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not be linear.  A richer data set is needed to investigate the impact of monitoring 
costs on the mode of investment more precisely.  
It would also be interesting to investigate other implications of monitoring 
costs for the character of international investment.  For instance, where monitoring 
costs are high, the foreign investor will avoid sunk investments, which implies that 
foreign investors will target businesses that are relatively less intensive in specific 
worker training, capital, and technology.  To the extent that monitoring costs are 
correlated with physical distance, we would expect to find that the more distant 
investments to be relatively less intensive in specific worker training, capital, and 
technology.   
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148 0  1 0.3986  0.4913 
DISTHK  (‘000 kilometers) 
distance to Hong Kong 
 
148 0.0720  5.724  1.253  1.216 
ESTCAP  (US$ 10 million) 


















proportion of sales to 
Chinese market 
 
148 0  1.0  0.2348  0.3341 
SEZ 
Special Economic Zone 
 
148 0  1 0.3197  0.4680 
AGE (months) 
age of investment 
 




148 0  1 0.3451  0.4771 
PARCAP (US$ 10 million) 
Parent capital 
 
123 0.002  4.151 0.1167 0.4077 
 





DISTHK ESTCAP  SALESPRC  SEZ  AGE  FUJIAN 
JV   1.000   
 
  0.354***    -0.043     0.220***   -0.289***    -0.062    -0.202** 
DISTHK     0.354*** 
 
  1.000     0.105     0.072   -0.352***     0.038    -0.075 
ESTCAP   -0.043 
 
  0.105     1.000    -0.047   -0.062    -0.053    -0.062 
SALESPRC    0.220*** 
 
  0.072    -0.047     1.000   -0.049    -0.165**     0.018 
SEZ   -0.289*** 
 
 -0.352***    -0.062    -0.049    1.000     0.099     0.341*** 
AGE 
 
 -0.062    0.038    -0.053    -0.165*    0.099     1.000     0.137 
FUJIAN   -0.202** 
 




*** Significant at 99% level 
**  Significant at 95% level 
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Dependent Variable: Joint Venture 
 
  (a)  
including 
outlier 















































SEZ              











Log(DISTHK)     0.381** 
(0.183) 
  
DISTHK x  ESTCAP        3.401 
(3.383) 
 
AGE                   
Age of investment 
     -0.00368 
(0.0104) 
FUJIAN       
PARCAP        
Parent capital 
     
No. of Observations  148  147  147  147  142 
Log Likelihood  -84.00  -78.40 -80.96 -77.82 -76.09 
LR  statistic  31.05 41.22 36.11 42.37 37.40 
 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
*** Significant at 99% 
      ** Significant at 95% 
      *  Significant at 90% 
© 2002, Chu-Chia S. Lin and Ivan P.L. Png  20Table 3: Investment Mode: Logit Model, Continued 
Dependent Variable: Joint Venture 
 
(f) (g) 
(h)      
Industry 
dummies# 






DISTHK         


























SEZ                  







Log(DISTHK)      
DISTHK x  ESTCAP      
AGE                     




PARCAP           
Parent capital 
  0.189 
(0.644) 
 
No. of Observations  147 123  147 
Log Likelihood  -76.76 -83.78  -77.01 
LR statistic  44.51 33.87  44.00 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** Significant at 99% 
        ** Significant at 95% 
         * Significant at 90% 
# For brevity, the industry dummy coefficients are not reported. 
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Dependent Variable: Equity Joint Venture 
 










DISTHK   Distance 





























SEZ              













AGE                  
Age of investment 









140 140 135 140 










   Standard errors in parentheses 
*** Significant at 99% 
    **   Significant at 95% 
       *    Significant at 90% 
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Appendix: the Kao et al. Data Set 
 
To collect information about the characteristics of Taiwanese investors and 
investments in China, Kao et al. (1992) sent a detailed questionnaire to investors 
that had registered with Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs up to October 1991.   
Each investor was sent only one questionnaire, regardless of the number of 
investments it had made in China.  The data set consisted of 337 records. 
 
  Item II.3 of the questionnaire asked respondents to check their mode of 
investment from four alternatives -- processing and assembly facility, wholly foreign-
owned enterprise (WFO), equity joint venture (EJV), and cooperative joint venture 
(CJV).  WFO, EJV, and CJV are mutually exclusive modes of direct investment.
12   By 
contrast, a processing and assembly facility is an enterprise that is eligible to import 
materials and semi-finished products free of tariffs or restrictions.  Such a facility 
may be owned by a wholly foreign-owned entity, or a joint venture.  Accordingly, it 
is not an investment mode.  
 
  Twenty-eight respondents did not answer the question on investment mode, 
73 checked only processing and assembly facility, while 11 checked more than one 
of the three investment modes, WFO, EJV, and CJV.
13  We deleted these 112 
records.  A further 41 respondents checked processing and assembly facility as well 
as one of the three modes.  We assigned each of these 41 to their respective mode. 
 
  We had to delete a further 77 records that did not include data on location, 
sales to the Chinese market, capital, or Taiwanese equity percentage (for joint 
ventures).   After accounting for all of these discrepancies, we had 148 records.  Of 
these, 89 were wholly foreign (Taiwanese) owned (WFO), 52 were equity joint 
ventures (EJV), and 7 were cooperative joint ventures (CJV).  
 
                                                           
12      The following review of Chinese regulations is based, in part, on China Business Law Guide, 
Sections 25-010 to 26-900, and 83-610 to 83-724. 
13      These 11 might possibly have made multiple investments in China. 
© 2002, Chu-Chia S. Lin and Ivan P.L. Png  23ESTCAP, the total capital employed when the factory was established, was 
calculated as follows.  If the enterprise was wholly-owned, then we set ESTCAP 
equal to the respondent's reported investment when the factory was established.  If 
the enterprise was a joint venture, we calculated ESTCAP as the respondent's 
reported investment when the factory was established divided by the (Taiwanese) 
respondent's equity percentage.  
   
 Kao  et al. (1992) collected the capital of the Taiwanese parent in New Taiwan 
dollars.  We converted the data at the exchange rate of 26.02 New Taiwan dollars to 
1 U.S. dollar, which is the average of the exchange rates for October and November, 
1991.  
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